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The Impact of EU Enlargement on the Euro-Med Partnership 
 
 
 
Introduction 
The EC/EU’s concern with stability on its southern borders and its relationship to 
enlargement stretches back to the 1970’s. But its most important policy initiative burst on 
the scene in 1995 when the Spanish presidency of the EU organized a conference in 
Barcelona, with the 15 members of the EU and 12 countries of the South Mediterranean. 
The outcome was the Barcelona Declaration or Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) 
Initiative. In launching this initiative, EU foreign ministers recognized a need to respond 
to “new” security issues emanating from the region, such as drug trafficking, human 
rights violations, and environmental degradation (Joffe 1998).  In addition, many EU 
officials saw the EMP as a strategy to compete with other trade blocks, without having to 
invite non-European Mediterranean countries to join the EU. Finally, EU ministers 
believed that the initiative would “add another layer in a comprehensive European effort 
to help settle the Arab-Israeli conflict” (Solingen 2002). 
Backed by the largest EU financial commitment ever made outside the Union, the 
Barcelona Declaration launched a set of economic, political, cultural, and social 
initiatives whose stated purpose was to extend southward the European area of stability. 
The EMP became the EU’s main Middle East policy instrument; indeed, it became the 
only regional organization in which both the Palestinian Authority and Israel are 
included. It also was designed as the EU’s preferred tool for engaging Islam in a 
“dialogue of civilizations,” and its central foreign economic policy in the region as a 
whole.
1  
Most importantly, however, the EU Commission represented the EMP as an 
ambitious attempt to invent a region that does not yet exist and to create a regional 
identity that would rest, neither on blood, nor religion, but on civil society, economic 
interdependence, voluntary networks and civic beliefs. The stated aim of this experiment 
was to construct in the Mediterranean region a pluralistic security community whose 
practices are synonyms of peace and stability (Adler and Crawford 2004). 
 
This essay assesses the impact of the 2004 EU enlargement on the aims of the 
Euro-Med Partnership and the prospects for its success.  Does the Mediterranean policy 
of an enlarged Europe herald a new era of foreign policy behavior—as stated in the 
Barcelona Declaration—or does it represent the continued politics of power and 
                                                           
1 EMP is a wide multilateral framework of political, economic, and social relations that, before EU 
enlargement, involved 700 million people in 27 countries or territories around the Mediterranean.  In 
addition to the 15 EU states, the EMP included Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Malta, 
Morocco, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, and the Palestinian Authority.  EU enlargement has turned Cyprus and 
Malta, which, until May 2004 were partner countries, into full members of the Union. It also has added 
eight more countries to the EMP: the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, 
Slovakia and Slovenia. 
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domination?  Either way, will the net impact be a stabilizing one, enhancing regional 
security and economic prosperity, or will it be destabilizing, widening the gap between 
Europe and its southern neighbors?   
 
These questions are of crucial importance, not only because of the vital 
significance of the Mediterranean and the urgent need to resolve conflicts born there, but 
also because the search for their answers allows us to explore the content of the EU’s 
foreign policy.  Much of the recent literature on this topic has described Europe as a 
“civilian power,” whose foreign policy aim is the projection of norms and values-- 
democracy, the rule of law, peacekeeping and human rights--, rather than the 
maintenance and expansion of material interests.
2  Indeed, the EU is the world’s largest 
bilateral aid donor, providing twice as much development aid to the world as the United 
States.  The EU is also the largest importer of agricultural goods from the developing 
world.  Some analysts believe that this deployment of “soft power,” renders the use of 
“hard power” less necessary (Khanna 2004).   
 
As Nicolaidis (2003) and Wendt (1999) have argued, the EU has chosen to be 
weak in military capabilities, because it has adopted a “Kantian” culture.  Many have 
argued that the EU’s power rests on the ability to attract states to become members or 
partners of a political community, the access to which depends on the adoption of a set of 
norms, practices, and institutions.  In the words of Graham Fuller (2003) Europeans have 
“forged their homelands into a new cooperative whole,” and taken their power to be “the 
power of a gradually expanding international community of consent.”  Most analysts, 
noting the dearth of EU military power, argue that Europe’s strength lies “in the ethical 
reach of its foreign policy” (Bicchi 2004).  As noted above, the EU’s stated aim in the 
Mediterranean is to construct a region in which European values can take root in order to 
meet new security challenges with a non-security based policy (Williams 1998, Manners 
2002, Spencer 2002, Moravcsik 2003, Whitman 2002). 
 
Another interpretation of the EU’s aims, however, has emerged from “realist” 
interpretations of international politics.  Attina (2004) notes that by taking on the role of 
“region builder and partnership maker” the EU aims to exert direct influence over 
Mediterranean politics.  This role, he argues, can be interpreted as that of an external 
power attempting to change the domestic politics of its neighboring countries for its own 
benefit.  Clearly the EMP was devised to protect EU member states from the adverse 
consequences of large-scale migration flows and from an uncontrolled flood of 
competing agricultural products that might enter the European market under WTO 
agreements—an effort on the part of the EU to control the region for its own benefit by 
exploiting its asymmetric relationship with North African and Middle Eastern States. In 
                                                           
2 The idea of Europe as a “civilian power” is best captured by Duchêne (1973): “The European 
Community’s interest as a civilian group of countries long on economic power and relatively short on 
armed force is as far as possible to domesticate relations between states, including those of its own 
members and those with states outside its frontiers. This means trying to bring international problems the 
sense of common responsibility and structures of contractual politics, which have been in the past 
associated exclusively with ‘home’ and not foreign, that is alien, affairs.”  
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fact, the origins of the EMP can be located in a pronouncement made by EU foreign 
ministers at an EU Summit. Institutionally, it is defined, administered and funded from 
Brussels. There are no headquarters or civil servants dedicated to this project outside EU 
structures and thus no symbolic venue with which it can be identified. The very fact that 
the timeline for appraisal of the process is successive EU presidencies is telling. From the 
South, the enterprise is interpreted more often through the core-periphery paradigm than 
as an instance of positive sum liberalism: a (friendly) takeover rather than a joint venture.  
Indeed, for centuries, the Mediterranean Sea stood for the “mare nostrum” belonging to 
the Greeks and then the Romans. The relationship between European countries and the 
Mediterranean states has deep colonial roots, saturated with a history of domination and 
exploitation.  Realists believe that the Euro-Med process is a strategy to consolidate 
regional dominance rather than “build” a region (Crawford 2004). 
 
Realists also believe that the same quest for supremacy lies behind the project of 
EU enlargement.  Many analysts (i.e. Kupchan 2003, Rifkin 2004, Reid 2004, Kegan 
2004) have used the occasion of the 2004 EU enlargement to reflect on Europe as an 
ascendant world power.  Some have gone so far as to note that as the EU enlarges 
eastward, it will come to dominate the geopolitics of Eurasia, gradually replacing 
America as the arbiter of the globe's strategic heartland.   
 
In this context, the “Euro-Med Partnership” may be nothing more than an attempt 
to control the geopolitics of North Africa and the Middle East.  Should the EMP in the 
context of EU enlargement and the “new neighborhood” policy be interpreted as the aim 
of a “civilian power” in the service of peace and prosperity for all?  Or is the EMP a 
guise in which the power politics of an enlarged EU are played out?   
 
It is still too soon to amass definitive evidence that would provide credible 
answers to these questions.  Nonetheless, some trends are coming to light.  In providing 
what I hope to be informed speculation on the impact of enlargement on the EMP, this 
essay begins by briefly tracing the history of the Barcelona Process. It does so by first 
briefly examining the impact of previous EC enlargements on the Mediterranean, 
beginning with the accession of the UK in the 1970s as the impetus for the creation of a 
Mediterranean region.  It then provides a snapshot of the Southern enlargement, which 
led to the de facto partition of the Mediterranean.  In this historical context it looks to the 
creation of the EMP in 1995 and assesses its achievements, failures, and the obstacles to 
success.  Finally it turns to an assessment of the 2004 enlargement, with its corollary, the 
notion of a Wider Europe--New neighborhood and its goal of extending European norms 
beyond its borders.   
 
The role of EC enlargements in creating and undermining the Mediterranean 
“region” 
The first step in the stabilization of Europe’s southern borders through the projection of 
“Western” values was to invent a Mediterranean “space” within which Western values 
could be projected.   In the early life of the EC, before the region was invented, the 
Commission and the member states had related to the EC’s southern neighbors through   4
widely divergent bilateral policies and agreements (Haas 1990).  In fact, it was the first 
EC enlargement that initially spurred the idea of a single region.     
 The run-up to the UK’s accession raised the issue of the EC’s relationship with 
third countries.  Before its admission into the EC, the UK had very low import duties, 
benefiting not only its former colonies but also countries around the Mediterranean.   
When the UK joined the EEC, it had to adopt the common external tariff, which was 
much higher.  Thus, non-member Mediterranean countries who had been traditional 
exporters to the UK saw the writing on the wall: they would lose the UK market to 
member states whose exports to the UK would be duty free and subsidized by the 
common agricultural policy.  As this issue rose to the top of the EC agenda, the 
Commission and member countries began to debate the appropriate adjustment of 
existing agreements with Mediterranean countries.  Should there be a common tariff for 
them?  Or should bilateral relations continue to prevail?   
 
Other problems raised the visibility of the issue: concerns over terrorism and oil 
defined the European Community’s key interest in the stability of the Mediterranean 
region.  Terrorism had been on the rise in Europe, spilling over from the Arab-Israeli 
conflict, and all member states began to tighten immigration controls in order to prevent 
terrorist networks from taking root on European soil.  The gathering oil crisis jarred 
Europeans into a reconsideration of their dependence on Arab oil, the need for secure 
supplies, and the maintenance of good relations with Arab countries.  
Driven by all of these concerns,  the EC launched the Global Mediterranean 
Policy (GMP) (Bicchi 2002, pp. 4-5).  The goal was to create a free trade area covering 
all of the countries surrounding the Mediterranean Sea, excluding Albania, Yugoslavia, 
and Libya, and including Spain, Portugal, and Greece.  The GMP offered trade 
concessions for the non-member Mediterranean countries (NMMCs) in their economic 
relations with the EC, aid, and social provisions for migrants from the Maghreb in 
Europe. It also offered agricultural concessions and eliminated its own tariffs on 
industrial imports originating from the MNMCs while allowing them to retain their own 
tariff barriers.  
Because this policy applied to all targeted states equally and was an EC policy 
rather than that of a member state, the concept of a “Mediterranean Region” was codified.  
Bicchi (2004) reports that EEC documents addressing trade policy toward the 
Mediterranean basin clearly show the evolution of the idea of a single “region.”  For 
example, a 1971 report originating in the European Parliament argued against the 
approach of ‘agreements à la carte’ that had prevailed until this time, because they did not 
create among Mediterranean peoples “this certainty of belonging to one and the same 
region of the world, having its own personality, its brand image.” 
 
This view, however, was undercut with the accession of Spain, Greece, and 
Portugal.  The inclusion of these three states took them out of the GMP and thus divided 
the “region” that the Commission was trying to cultivate. Tovias (2004) goes so far as to 
argue that the inclusion of the three new members was obtained at the expense of the   5
economic stability of the western and eastern Mediterranean non-members.  Although 
there were similarities among the economies around the Mediterranean in the agricultural 
sector as well as many industrial sectors, non-members lost trade revenue when trade was 
diverted to the new members.  For example, Morocco’s citrus and tomato exports to the 
EC were replaced by exports from Spain and Portugal. This lost trade expanded the 
economic cleavage between EC members and Mediterranean non-members. The gap 
grew even wider as EC development policies targeting the new members began to take 
effect, leaving the Mediterranean non-members in the dust. In short, as Nicolaidis and 
Nicolaidis (2005) argue, the southern enlargement undermined the ‘regional promotion 
policy’ and the idea of ‘Mediterranean’ as it was conceptualized in the GMP.  Even then, 
it appeared that the EC was attempting to create a region of predominantly “Muslim” or 
“Arab” states separate from “Europe.”  This, then, represented a de facto partition of the 
Mediterranean. 
 
Reviving the Mediterranean “region?” 
 
Throughout the 1980s, with global politics still dominated by East-West confrontation, 
the creation of a Mediterranean region of cooperation and stability was a low priority for 
the world’s powerful states.  The end of the Cold War, however, presented new 
challenges and promised to eliminate the obstacles to a renewed regional initiative.   
Xenophobia triggered fears of massive immigration from North Africa, and the cold 
war’s end gave rise to the new security threats emerging from militant Islamic 
fundamentalism, its link with terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction.  
As early as 1992, the European Council of Lisbon had expressed its unease at the 
"advance of extremist forces... in various North African countries."  Two years later, the 
European Council of Essen elevated the Mediterranean to a "priority zone of strategic 
importance to Europe."  
 
To combat these perceived threats, and because France feared that Europe would 
drift eastward with a reunited Germany and the prospect of EU membership for the 
countries of East Central Europe, the European Community began an initiative called 
“Renovated Mediterranean Policy,” which dealt mainly with financial aid to NMMC’s, 
aiming to boost regional economic development through cooperation, and to increase 
regional trust and transparency. And at the behest of France, Italy and Spain, NATO 
formulated a Mediterranean policy in 1994, promising to work with non-members to 
strengthen regional stability, and began to lobby the EU to concoct a new policy towards 
“Islam."   
 
Encouraged by progress in the Arab-Israeli peace process, the idea of re-creating 
a “Mediterranean Region” crept higher on the policy agenda, and the EU became 
formally involved in the project of creating regional stability.  The first major steps were 
taken at the European Council Summit of 1992, which were followed by the Barcelona 
Declaration creating the EMP in 1995. The basic premise of that initiative was that the 
Euro-Mediterranean area constituted a “common space,” or at least that it possessed 
enough of the precursor elements of a region (geographic contiguity, common values, 
traditions, or interests) to make regional building a possibility.  Stephen Calleya (2002)   6
writes that “from this premise flowed two other assumptions: that the member-states or 
regimes were equally committed to the goal of regional cooperation as a tool to promote 
peace, stability and prosperity; and that they were also receptive to the kinds of political, 
economic and social liberalization that makes transnational (as opposed to inter-
governmental) cooperation possible.”   
  
  The Barcelona Declaration established 3 baskets, (a) security on the basis of 
mutual confidence and partnership, (b) a zone of shared prosperity through economic 
integration, and (c) the rapprochement between peoples through social and cultural links 
leading to the creation of a Mediterranean civil society. Economic proposals in the 
Barcelona Declaration included the establishment of a Free Trade Area between the 
Union and Southern Mediterranean countries by 2010 and the removal of their tariff and 
non-tariff barriers.  The creation of a free trade zone was intended to shift the adjustment 
costs of trade to the NMMCs, after 20 years of EC/EU trade concessions enshrined in the 
GMP.  Through the agreement to create a Free Trade Zone, the Keynesian ideas of 
development contained in the GMP gave way to the neo-liberal ideas of the Washington 
Consensus (Tovias 2004). 
 
Economic aid and loans from the European Investment Bank were to benefit the 
NMMCs’ private sector and to encourage structural reform and privatization.
3  The 
central financial instrument for EMP is the MEDA (Measures d’Accompagnement)   
program, offering technical and financial support as incentives for social and political 
reform.  MEDA II (1999) created the "structural adjustment facility" financed under 
MEDA I to target more specifically the reforms necessary for free trade with the EU on 
the one hand and to streamline EU decision making on the other.
4  The Barcelona process 
also aimed at encouraging “good governance,” namely democracy and human rights, and 
advanced the development of confidence-building measures to enhance regional security. 
The political element of the Barcelona declaration includes a list of principles concerning 
respect for democracy and the rule of law, human rights, the right of self-determination, 
non-interference in the internal affairs of other states, and peaceful resolution of disputes.  
 
Some progress has been made on each of these three fronts. In April 2002, the 
Euro-Med partners adopted the Valencia Action Plan, making sustainable development 
the guiding principle of the Euro-Med Process.  The action plan included reinforced 
credit facilities for Mediterranean partner countries through the European Investment 
Bank (EIB) and the creation of a Euro-Mediterranean Foundation to promote cultural 
exchange.
5  EMP is acting as a catalyst for the improvement of bilateral cooperation; 
                                                           
3 For early assessments of the economic basket of the EMP see Marks (1996) and Galal and 
Hoekman (1997). 
 
4 The MEDA Regulation was adopted in 1996, and the beneficiaries were Algeria, Cyprus, Egypt, 
Israel, Jordan, Malta, Morocco, Lebanon, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey and the West Bank and Gaza Strip.  
 
5  The plan aims for 2 billion euros (1.8 billion dollars) per year in EIB loans by 2006. The 
economic and financial provisions of the EMP seek to achieve a Euro-Mediterranean Free  Trade 
Agreement (FTA) by 2010 and to promote regional development by attracting foreign direct investment 
(FDI).   7
bilateral economic agreements have been signed, and EU-Med trade has increased every 
year.  Furthermore, in 2003, a Facility for Euro-Mediterranean Investment and 
Partnership (FEMIP) was created.  The FEMIP supplements MEDA in supporting private 
sector development of the Mediterranean partners in order to attract investments to the 
region.  In 2004 the EU devoted € 1 billion to development of the Mediterranean region, 
a large increase over previous years.  As a result, there have been substantial 
improvements in infrastructure throughout the region (transport, telecommunications and 
energy, as well as the interconnection of the Mediterranean partners’ infrastructures with 
the Trans-European networks).   
 
Other areas have achieved positive results as well. There has been an increase in 
regional cooperation in the field of Justice, and agreements to combat terrorism and drug 
trafficking have been signed.   EMP enthusiasts have patiently built a host of civil society 
networks to promote common cultural and security understandings, including 
EuroMeSCo, a security think-tank, which has become an important example and leading 
promoter of public diplomacy in the region. Finally, the EMP has begun its own process 
of “enlargement,” with plans to integrate Libya and enlarge the free trade zone to six Gulf 
countries, as well as the conclusion of an agreement with Syria. 
 
Despite these achievements, however, to date, the disappointments have 
overshadowed the successes.  The objectives of the EMP were slated to be confirmed by 
twenty-seven Mediterranean states in Malta in 1997.  But the stalled Middle East peace 
process and ensuing tensions in the Middle East overshadowed the meeting and cast 
grave doubts on the partnership’s success. Subsequent meetings, including at Stuttgart, 
Marseille, and Valencia did very little to push the EMP forward.  Negotiations began on a 
Euro-Mediterranean Charter for Stability and Peace, but because Mediterranean 
governments had divergent perceptions of threats and challenges to political stability, 
they were short-lived (Attina 2004).
6  On the economic front, private sector investment 
has only trickled into the NMMC’s, and a huge economic gap between EU and the 
NMMCs remains and continues to grow.  Indeed, the sum of the GDP of the 10 partner 
countries is as high as the Spanish GDP alone.  In contrast to the EMP Mediterranean 
partner countries, the new member states of the EU have grown much faster: the 
combined income of the 10 NMMCs is only one tenth of combined income of the new 
EU members.  Likewise, progress toward democracy in the southern Mediterranean states 
has been slow compared to the pace of democratization in Latin America, Eastern 
Europe, East Asia, and sub-Saharan Africa.  
 
Obstacles to success in EMP 
Why these disappointments?  As noted above, the Israeli-Arab conflict, in general, and 
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, in particular, together with the events that were unleashed 
                                                                                                                                                                             
 
6 The original plan was to launch the document at the Marseille Conference in November 2000, 
but progress on the Charter stopped at this very meeting. 
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by the terrorist attacks of 9/11, provide two of the most visible obstacles to the realization 
of the goals of the Barcelona Declaration. Since the EMP’s inception in 1995, the Middle 
East peace process has been halting and uncertain, and the higher the tensions, the more 
the EMP has been disrupted and weakened.  Thus when the “El-Aksa Intifada” erupted in 
2000, and the bloodshed began, the EMP entered a phase of permanent crisis. The 
Palestinian crisis cut a deep cleft between Israel and moderate Arab countries and 
between Israel and Europe. The triangular partnership between Europe, the Arab world, 
and Israel was thrown into turmoil. 
  
But the failed Isreali-Palestinian peace process has not been the only roadblock to 
EMP progress.  A number of other obstacles have emerged to block or distort the 
realization of EMP goals.  Within Europe we have seen a move to the right and the rise of 
nationalism, with frightening implications for the EU’s relations with the Arab world and 
specifically for the Euro-Mediterranean process and its multilateral agenda.  In recent 
years, anti-immigrant parties have enjoyed alarming success in elections throughout 
Europe.  Their decidedly anti-liberal stance, nationalism, xenophobia, and commitment to 
territoriality, sovereignty and self-reliance spell a rejection of “multilateralism,” 
openness, and construction of a regional identity--principles which lie at the heart of the 
Euro-Mediterranean partnership.   
 
Despite the fact that Europe will need to revitalize its labor force with immigrants 
in the coming years
7 and youth unemployment in the Mediterranean partner countries is a 
growing scourge, anti-immigration sentiment continues to grow.  Fears that right wing 
majorities would demand a “Fortress Europe” were deepened in 2002 when EU members 
of the European Council appeared determined to strengthen border controls to stem 
immigration from the Mediterranean region.  British Prime Minister Tony Blair had even 
suggested that the British Royal Navy might be willing to use gun boats in the 
Mediterranean in order to halt immigrants from entering the EU (Shaaban 2003). 
 
A third obstacle is the persistence and strengthening of authoritarian regimes in 
North Africa and in the Middle East.  These regimes reject the liberal orientation of the 
Barcelona process and resist any kind of “conditionality” imposed upon them. As Calleya 
(2002) writes: “many of the requirements of free trade and greater foreign investment 
(abolition of monopolies and licensing arrangements, reduction of customs and excise 
fees, legal security and transparency, autonomous civil society organizations and 
institutions) threaten the revenue-base and even the power base of neo-patrimonial 
authoritarian regimes.”  Many of these states are also torn by internal schisms and by 
blurred territorial definitions. Their very existence is tenuous, and their own national 
identities are uncertain. It is questionable whether, without a secure national identity, 
                                                           
7 By 2023, the ratio of working to retired people in the EU will fall from 4:1 to 2:1. During the 
1990s employment increased three times more in Europe than in the Southern Mediterranean partner 
countries (9.8 percent per year as opposed to 3.4 percent.) Unemployment in the NMMCs is about 2.5 
times higher than in Europe.  Population growth and high unemployment in the NMMCs combined with 
labor market pulls from Europe have increased the pressure on migration (Handoussa and Reiffers 2003). 
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these states will be able to assume the regional identity believed to be necessary for the 
success of the EMP (Del Sarto 2003).  
 
A fourth obstacle lies in the divergence of expectations and goals that the various 
partners bring to the table.  While European countries seek stability through the “careful 
Westernization” of the Arab world (Tovias 2004), or the “convergence of civilizations” 
toward the European model, the Arab world seeks preferential access to European 
markets and development aid, resisting Europe’s vision of convergence.  
 
Two historical legacies—colonialism and economic “backwardness” provide a 
fifth obstacle. Colonial domination and exploitation have bred deep-seeded resentment 
and created cultures of victimization in North Africa and the Middle East.  The economic 
“backwardness” of the Arab states around the Mediterranean has been perpetuated and 
deepened by colonialism and European domination.  The trade dependence of the 
NMMCs on the EU has increased in recent years, while Europe’s trade dependence on 
the NMMCs is negligible and consists primarily of dependence on energy supplies.  Even 
that dependence is likely to weaken as the EU enlarges and begins to look eastward to the 
former Soviet Union to fill its energy requirements. The economic inequality between 
Europe and the rest of the Mediterranean has created a structure of asymmetrical 
interdependence, giving the EU the upper hand in all negotiations in the Euro-
Mediterranean process.   
   
The imbalance is reinforced in the Euro-med negotiating process: despite efforts 
to overcome bilateralism, European countries negotiate as a bloc through the EU, while 
the Southern Mediterranean countries sign agreements and negotiate bilaterally with the 
EU (as well as individual member states) on all issues.  Thus, the Barcelona Process, 
despite its multilateral dimension, did not amend a negotiating process that reinforced the 
power imbalance between the EU and its Euro-Med partners.  
 
Clearly, the management of the EMP by the Commission perpetuates and 
recreates an asymmetry between EU member states and the rest in a manner that 
continues to generate the critique of neo-colonialism; there is no equivalent management 
structure among the non-member partners of the EMP.  The Euromesco Joint Report of 
1997-98 suggested that while the Commission should retain a management role, stopping 
short of the creation of a Secretariat, a ‘ProMed’ group of civil servants from the 
NMMCs should be constituted to act in a management capacity as a partner of the 
Commission. However this form of institutionalization has yet to be implemented or 
discussed (Vasconcellos 2002, p. 2). With regard to the economic basket, all decisions 
are in the hands of the EU, where decisions on trade and aid are reached through 
compromises among the 25 members.
 8 
                                                           
8 There is no voting mechanism for EMP decisions. Although the European Parliament proposed 
the establishment of a Euro-Mediterranean Parliamentary Assembly at the Velencia meeting (Gillespie 
2002, p. 12), no concrete decisions have been taken to create one. Decisions in the EMP on political and 
cultural issues are made by consensus. There is no formal voting. Veto power by any of the 27 EMP 
members is the rule (Lannon et al. 2001, pp. 117-8). Before any EMP ministerial summit, each EMP 
member country prepares its national position on the different items on the agenda. Positions are shaped by 
a combination of business lobbies and member state conceptions of the national interest. While each state  10
  Aid is disbursed directly from the EU budget on a bi-lateral EU—individaul 
NMMC basis.  Tovias (2002) notes that the term “bilateral” is perhaps a misnomer 
because all aid is given on a unilateral basis from the EU to the NMMCs.  There have been 
no negotiations between the EU and NMMC within an EMP forum over how that aid is 
disbursed or how much aid will be offered to each MNMC. Before the Valencia meeting 
in April 2002, Spain advocated the creation of a Euro-Mediterranean Bank that would 
place EU members and non-members on an equal footing, a suggestion that found favor 
in several countries of the Maghreb.  But because of opposition from the northern 
European countries, the idea was diluted into increased credit provision via the European 
Investment Bank, where decisions on aid would continue to be made unilaterally by the 
EU (Gillispie 2002, p. 12). 
Enter the 2004 “Enlargement” and the “New Neighborhood” policy 
 
Will the 2004 Enlargement and the “New Neighborhood” policy contribute to progress in 
strengthening the Euro-Med partnership, or will it present yet another obstacle to 
cooperation?  Will it inject new life into the Barcelona process and its projection of 
“civilian” power?  Or will it feed into a relationship of dominance and dependence 
between the EU and the southern states of the Mediterranean? Whether positive or 
negative, there will certainly be an impact.  The 2004 enlargement of the EU created the 
largest internal market and the largest regional bloc in the world, a region that rivals the 
United States in population, gross domestic product, and scientific and technological 
capabilities. Now the EU accounts for almost half of the world’s foreign direct 
investment.  With this enhanced power base and extended global reach, it will have an 
even greater influence than before on its neighbors and on the world as a whole.   
  
Recognition of that influence is embodied in the “Wider Europe-New 
Neighborhood” policy (ENP).  In 2003, the European Commission published a concept 
paper, entitled title "Wider Europe – Neighborhood: A New Framework for Relations 
with our Eastern and Southern Neighbors.”  Directed explicitly to countries “that do not 
currently have the perspective of membership of the EU” (COM(2003) 104 final, 
11.3.2003, p. 4), its intent was to set forth an initiative that would “avoid drawing new 
dividing lines in Europe" (Commission 2003, p. 4)
9 but at the same time would stipulate 
relations with neighboring states who would have no concrete prospect of accession 
(Haukkala and Moshes 2004).  These states were “Russia, the countries of the Western 
Newly Independent States of the former Soviet Union and the Southern Mediterranean”, 
which “should be offered the prospect of a stake in the EU’s Internal Market and further 
integration and liberalisation to promote the free movement of – persons, goods, services 
and capital” (COM (2003) 104 final, 11.3.2003, p. 4). 
                                                                                                                                                                             
fashions its own position, the position of the EU member states is coordinated by the Commission; member 
states are represented by their own ministers at the EMP bi-annual intergovernmental Summit. There is 
almost no leeway for a state to negotiate its position once in the Summit (Tovias 2002). 
 
9 Of course enlargement creates new dividing lines.  New visas would be required in order to enter 
the new member states and the inclusion of new members in the Common Market created new trade 
barriers along the new eastern and southern borders of the EU. 
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Despite the stated effort to avoid divisions, the ENP divided the EU's 
“neighborhood” into three areas. In the first are the four official accession countries – 
Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania, and Turkey – as well as the applicant country Macedonia. 
Because they are potential accession countries, they are excluded from the “policy,” 
although they are presently in the “neighborhood.” In the second, to the East, are 
Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus and Russia.  Finally, to the south, 10 Southern Mediterranean 
countries in the EMP are grouped as potential partners "to develop a zone of prosperity 
and a friendly neighborhood."  The explicit goal in regard to these countries is “to anchor 
the EU’s offer of concrete benefits and preferential relations within a differentiated 
framework which responds to progress made by the partner countries in political and 
economic reform” (COM(2003) 104 final, 11.3.2003, p. 9). 
 
After the enlargement, in May 2004, the Commission published a further strategy 
paper on the EU’s “neighborhood policy.”  This paper added the Southern Caucuses as 
“neighbors” for purposes of the policy and included Action Plans calling for  "political 
dialogue and reform; trade measures preparing partners for gradually obtaining a stake in 
the EU's Internal Market; justice and home affairs; energy, transport, information society, 
environment and research and innovation; and social policy and people-to-people 
contacts" (Commission 2004). Echoing the earlier paper, the EU would offer incentives 
to the neighboring countries in return for successful implementation of political and 
economic reform and adoption of EU rules.
10  In the Fall of 2004, the Commission added 
financial incentives, providing something like the EU structural funds in return for 
compliance with the Action Plans.  These incentives would, in turn, influence internal 
developments in the EU’s neighboring states. Finally, the strategy paper strongly 
encouraged sub-regional cooperation in Eastern Europe and the Mediterranean 
(Commission 2004). It names several issue areas where sub- regional cooperation is 
considered useful, for example in the realm of economic cooperation, environment, 
nuclear safety and natural resources, migration, civil society etc. 
 
Many analysts and the EU Commission itself have proclaimed that the most 
recent enlargement and the attending “New Neighborhood” initiative will only strengthen 
the goals of the Barcelona process. 
11  For example, as a more powerful actor on the 
world stage, the EU may be able to exert more muscle in bringing the Israeli-Palestinian 
                                                           
10  These are: Extension of the Internal Market and regulatory structures, preferential trading 
relations and market opening; perspectives for lawful migration and movement of persons; intensified 
cooperation to prevent and combat common security threats; greater political involvement of the EU in 
conflict prevention and crisis migration; greater efforts to promote human rights, further cultural 
cooperation and enhanced mutual understanding, integration into transport, energy and telecommunications 
networks and the European research area; new instruments for investment promotion and protection; 
support for integration into the global trading system; enhanced assistance, better tailored needs; new 
sources of finance. 
 
11 The 2004 EU enlargement brought two Mediterranean Partners (Cyprus and Malta) into the EU, 
while adding a total of 10 to the number of member states. The Euro-Mediterranean Partnership thus now 
comprises 35 members, 25 EU member states and 10 Mediterranean Partners (Algeria, Egypt, Israel, 
Jordan, Lebanon, Morocco, Palestinian Authority, Syria, Tunisia and Turkey). Libya has observer status 
since 1999. 
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conflict to a peaceful solution. And the membership of Malta and Cyprus—and later 
Turkey—might be important in keeping Mediterranean issues high on the EU agenda. 
(Shaaban 2003).  Gillespie (2004) suggests that the new member states may support the 
Euro-Med process if they conclude that “democracy promotion in particular is an area of 
EU activity in which they have a rare opportunity to underline their own national 
achievements.”  He goes on to report that “according to optimistic scenarios traced by 
European officials, the new initiative may encourage the introduction of instrumental 
reforms by ‘reluctant democratizers’. . .  and could even strengthen the local appeal of 
pro-democracy political elements within North African countries.  Finally, it has been 
suggested that the NMMCs need not fear that migration from the new member states will 
further block the “free movement of people” from the Southern Mediterranean:  although 
the new members add new workers to the EU population, the demographic characteristics 
of the new member states are very similar to the EU 15
12, and migration will be 
restricted, at least in the short run.  Thus the new members will not add significant weight 
to current migration flows and will not affect the flows of migration coming from the 
Southern Mediterranean (Handoussa and Reiffers 2003).  
 
Economic Benefits or Costs? 
 
In fact, however, the most obvious impact of enlargement will be economic.   
Enlargement not only opens new markets to the Southern Mediterranean countries, it has 
changed tariff and non-tariff barriers to trade, abolishing non-tariff barriers for new 
members, and keeping them in place for the EMP countries linked to the EU through a 
Free Trade agreement.  This means that the NMMC’s will have to enhance their 
competitiveness and pay even more attention to economic reform.  Private investment 
decisions will be affected by changes in market prospects.  And labor market 
considerations will change, influencing migration patterns. Public financial flows will 
also be affected. In preparation for the 2004 accession, the EU devoted the bulk of its 
technical and financial aid to the prospective new members. To date, the volume of EU 
aid for the Euro-Med region is miniscule when compared to what was disbursed in the 
accession countries before May 2004.  By 2003, EU funds allocated to the accession 
countries averaged € 545 per capita per year compared to €14 per capita per year for the 
Euromed partners (Handoussa and Reiffers 2003) The hope among some southern 
Mediterranean analysts is that now the EU can devote more resources to the EMP, in 
particular, its economic basket (Shaaban 2003).  
 
As noted above, the “New neighborhood” policy includes a proposal for deeper 
integration of the neighboring countries, including the Mediterranean partners, in the EU 
Single Market, not only for goods (an aspect that is largely covered by the Association 
Agreements) but also for services, capital movements and (as a long-term objective) 
movement of persons. Harmonization of the regulatory environment and liberalization of 
trade in services may potentially have even stronger positive economic effects than 
liberalization of trade in goods. 
                                                           
12 Handoussa and Reiffers (2003) report that the average growth rates of the population of the 
Central East European countries were -0.15% between 1975 and 2000.   13
But some analysts are skeptical.  Tovias (2002) argues that as the EU looks 
eastward for products that currently come from MNMCs, EU non-tariff trade barriers will 
“bite” more than before.  This will deepen Arab suspicions of European neo-colonial 
intentions in the Euro-Med process.  Agricultural competitors from the new member 
states are already slowing Egyptian agricultural exports to the EU to a trickle. Despite 
claims to the contrary (Wallström 2005, Ferrero-Waldner 2005) enlargement is likely to 
have an adverse impact on Mediterranean countries' export access and market share in the 
EU.  
    Some trends in this direction have already emerged.  Handoussa and Reiffers 
(2003) report that NMMC exports to the EU increased by 7.2% per year on average since 
1990 (8.4% for non-oil exports) versus 4.2% toward the rest of the world (6.9% non-oil). 
This increase drove up the share of total exports from the Mediterranean Partners to the 
EU from 45% in 1990 to 51% in 2001. On the other hand, the exports of the accession 
countries to the EU increased by 10.5% per year on average since 1995, versus 8.7% with 
the rest of the world, thus increasing the share of the accession countries’ exports to the 
EU to 67% in 2001. This differentiated progress led to a significant growth of the 
accession countries’ market share in the EU (10.9% of EU non-European imports in 2002 
versus 7% in 1995) larger than the growth in the share of the NMMCs (6.6% in 2002 
versus 5.6% in 1995). 
 
Furthermore, with EU enlargement, most Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) from 
the EU 15 is now flowing to the new member countries in Eastern Europe.  Without an 
infusion of capital, non-member countries of the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) 
will most likely remain low-wage raw materials suppliers and export platforms for the 
EU’s industrial machine. To the extent that FDI flows into the region, it will be attracted 
by low-cost labor and will concentrate in labor-intensive production methods across the 
industrial spectrum.  In modern sectors, plants in these countries might be simply 
“screwdriver factories”—assembling final products, importing key components, and 
using few local suppliers.  Other foreign investments might be in “services”—sales, 
marketing, and distribution outlets for imports produced in the EU.  Or investments will 
flow to low-technology extractive sectors, like oil and gas.  All innovative activity would 
continue to be concentrated in the EU as the “core.” This means that prospects for rapid 
economic development of the NMMCs are bleak.  
 
Will the new member states support the EMP?  Gillespie (2004) suggests that, 
having undergone the stress of transforming their own political and economic systems in 
order to qualify for EU membership, they may be reluctant to support economic programs 
that bolster North African and Middle Eastern states that do not reform their regimes and 
address the root causes of political instability. At best, because they must continue to 
focus on their own economic growth and political reforms, and they may show little 
interest in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.  After all, they are potential competitors 
in trade, and only 2 per cent of total EMP exports are now bound for the new member 
countries of the EU.   
 
Although certainly not all of the evidence is in, and the impact of enlargement 
will vary for the countries of the Southern Mediterranean, I believe that EU enlargement  14
is unlikely to help close the economic gap between North and South in the Mediterranean 
region.  As noted above, in the run-up to enlargement, as the economies of the accession 
countries grew, most of the EU`s Mediterranean partners moved ahead very slowly. 
Indeed, the economic gap between the EU and the NMMCs is widening at an alarming 
rate.  And as Stephen Calleya (2002) has noted, in the run-up to enlargement, “the 
prosperity gap with Europe, especially Central European countries . . . would have 
widened even further without the recent rise of oil prices and a significant slowdown of 
demographic growth, the only positive developments in the [Mediterranean] region.” 
 
“New Neighborhood”: Integration or Exclusion? 
 
Contrary to the EU’s claims above, the “New Neighborhood” policy accompanying 
enlargement seems to signal exclusion rather than closer integration into the European 
“space,” and—like the enlargements of the 1980s—to again prevent the creation of a 
Mediterranean “region.”  Indeed, efforts to design and build a “New Neighborhood 
policy” may subvert the region-building project of the EMP.  Four indicators of 
subversion are likely to appear:  1) new divisions in the Mediterranean region resulting 
from enlargement, 2) the weakening of sub-regional cooperation, 3) perceptions of 
exclusion on the part of the NMMCs, and 4) contradictions in the conditionality 
requirements that may push the NMMCs further from Europe.  Each of these indicators 
deserves brief discussion. 
 
First, this most recent enlargement, like earlier enlargements before it, have 
gathered some Mediterranean countries into its fold while explicitly espousing a policy of 
exclusion for others, since there is nothing in the ENP that offers the prospect of 
accession.  This means that the NMMCs must bear the burden of adjustment to the EU’s 
rules and norms without the prospect of membership.  And a new class of economic 
winners and losers may be created by the ENP, dividing the region further. 
 
Secondly, the ENP may inhibit cooperation among the countries of the Southern 
Mediterranean.  In April 2000, Chris Patten, in an effort to build reliable regional 
negotiating partners, advocated the creation of sub-regional free trade areas, offering EU 
support for any efforts to establish multilateralism as a principle of South-South 
Cooperation.  In 2001, the Arab League established an Arab Free Trade Area to be 
completed by 2007.  In addition, the Agadir Declaration of May 2001 announced the 
establishment of a free trade area between Morocco, Tunisia, Egypt and Jordan.  The EU 
offered technical assistance to the “Agadir Process,” and the Valencia Action Plan 
supported efforts on the part of North African countries to revive the Arab Maghreb 
Union.   
 
But the ENP is very likely to undermine these efforts.  As Fischer (2005) has 
pointed out, “although the ENP strategy paper strengthens the idea of sub-regional 
cooperation, ENP remains by and large a bilateral approach to the region.”  And as 
Gillespie (2004) writes: “In the absence of a strong Maghrebi or North African regional 
bloc, some countries may obtain material benefits from a substantial increase in  15
integration with Europe (so long as the policy is adequately funded) . . . . Others may fail 
to qualify for—or decide not to seek—a comparable place on the revised ‘pyramid of 
privilege’ (the metaphor traditionally used when classifying EU relations with third 
countries); in response, they may become more inward-looking and reliant on traditional 
sources of cohesion and identity, or may look for alternative international alignments.”   
 
Third, Shaaban (2003) reports that one of the most pressing concerns generated 
by EU enlargement in the Southern Mediterranean is the inevitable feeling of exclusion 
from the EU.  And this exclusion is based only on geography - the “simple fact of being 
located on the "wrong" side of the Mediterranean.” Feelings of exclusion can produce 
hostility, fuel social discontent, and strengthen perceptions of discrimination upon which 
radical political elites like to feast.  This slippery slope of exclusion, hostility, and 
backlash can generate friction around the Mediterranean Sea that will further cause a 
fragile “regional identity” to disintegrate. 
 
Finally, the liberal agenda of the Barcelona Process and of the ENP carries with it 
its own problems and contradictions that exacerbate the consequences of perceptions of 
exclusion.  In the short run, economic inequities are exacerbated by the conditionality 
policies of economic liberalization.  In this way, economic liberalization can undermine 
the process of political liberalization envisioned at Barcelona and in the ENP by 
exacerbating economic inequality and thus endangering liberal democracy.   George 
Joffe’s (2002) discussion of the effects of the imposition of the “Washington Consensus” 
in Algeria provides an apt example. There, economic liberalization facilitated the growth 
of an unaccountable elite, feeding on patronage and outside of the control of the 
democratic state.  
  
Furthermore, liberalism is considered by many Muslim critics to be an 
unattractive blueprint for social and economic life.  Its relentless insistence on individual 
freedom and competition weakens community. Community provides protection, 
cooperation, and mutual obligation, but strong community also interferes with the 
operation of the market and its principles of individual self-interest and competition.   
Markets, in turn, breed insecurity and inequality, feeding the longing for human 
community.  Many Muslim critics regard the market as deficient and flawed for these 
reasons.   
  And many Muslim leaders eschew democracy, arguing that many democracies 
pay only lip service to the rule of law, minority and citizen rights, and independent 
judicial review.  With its “tyranny of the majority,” repression of minorities, and absence 
of a binding system of values, democratic systems, they argue, can actually exacerbate 
social and cultural conflict. In periods of economic uncertainty and political transition, 
when states that once provided entitlements pull back or are dismantled according to neo-
liberal demands, when democracies are so constructed that they fail to protect rights, and 
when the introduction of markets leads to deep insecurities, the strong values and rich 
symbolic resources of community and religion offer hope in their promise of collective 
power to those populations who feel powerless (Zakaria 1997, Crawford 1998).  
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In short, Europe's liberal identity and its liberal discourse and practices are out of 
step with the reality that Europe's interaction with Arab world has helped create. Thus, 
the Barcelona Process and the ENP may be caught between the language of post-
colonialism and the behavior of neo-colonialism.  What this means is that Europe’s 
insistence on liberal practices embodied in the Copenhagen criteria, which were so 
successful elsewhere, for example in eastern Europe, are out of step, not only with 
Muslim states and Europe's negative legacy in the Muslim world, but, also with Europe's 
own political objectives and its turn to the right. 
 
Conclusions 
 
Perhaps the most important aspect of the Euro-Med partnership for the creation of 
stability and prosperity on Europe’s southern border is the idea of “region building” 
contained in the Barcelona Declaration.  Theorists of regionalism point to regional 
integration in the post-cold war context as a key indicator of international change because 
regional integration changes the character of state sovereignty and national identity. 
Regions are conceptualized, not in terms of geographical contiguity, but rather in terms 
of purposeful social, political, cultural, and economic interaction among states that often 
(but not always) inhabit the same geographical space (Calleya 1997).  Theorists of the 
new regionalism hypothesize that the purposeful guidance of these interactions can lead 
to the creation of a regional political culture and a regional “identity” that will have 
important implications for peace and stability (Jong Choi and Caporaso 2002). Applied to 
the Mediterranean region, the hope is that the EuroMed process could serve as a 
laboratory for new forms of “mutual recognition in deep conflict prone settings . . . a 
laboratory for the honing of overlapping identities binding together groups and 
individuals. . . [inspiring] a different, truly universal, kind of international politics” 
(Nicolaidis and Nicolaidis 2005). ..  
 
But the arguments made here suggest that a number of factors, including the 
protracted Israel-Palestine conflict, the rise of right-wing extremism in Europe, the 
persistence of authoritarian regimes in the Southern Mediterranean and the tensions 
between economic and political liberalization militate against success in building a stable 
and prosperous Mediterranean region.  The enlargement of the EU and the accompanying 
“new neighborhood” policy may exacerbate these problems by limiting NMMC exports 
to Europe, by diverting resources from the EU 15 away from the Mediterranean region, 
by a lack of interest on the part of the new East European members in Mediterranean 
stability, by dividing the region again between members and non-members, and by 
inhibiting the growth of sub-regional cooperation. 
 
If this pessimistic scenario is correct, it is unlikely that the EU’s Mediterranean 
policy in the context of enlargement and the ENP signals a new era of “civilian power” 
with region-building as the longest pole in the tent.  The perpetuation of core-periphery 
relations, bilateralism, exclusion, conditionality, and perceptions of exploitation militate 
against region-building, possibly leading to the Mediterranean “tent’s” collapse.    17
The factors that have weakened the Barcelona Process all suggest that the 
“realist” view of Europe’s relationship with its neighbors may be the more correct one.  It 
is not Europe’s “magnetic allure,” as Robert Cooper calls it, that draws Europe’s 
neighbors to accept its human rights standards, its liberal democracy, or economic 
openness, but rather conditionality requirements for aid that place its neighbors at the 
bottom of a “pyramid of privilege,” that is likely to inhibit the kind of region-building 
that those who prefer the exercise of “civilian power” would like to see.  From the 
vantage point of the Southern Mediterranean, Europe’s behavior is that of a neo-
colonialist. 
Of course, there are good reasons to attempt region-building within the realist 
paradigm of international relations.  As Brooks and Wohlforth (2002) have remarked, 
“states often build regional partnerships in order to balance against the overwhelming 
power of another state.” The Euro-Med process was part of the EU’s effort to balance the 
influence of the United States.  If the EU could not yet aspire to be world hegemon, it 
could be a regional one, a power that would assert its preeminence over the US in North 
Africa and the Middle East. This preeminence would not be induced by direct political 
action, mediations, and missions, but rather by a systematic use of economic tools to 
create a region for political ends.   
 
But the project of EU enlargement has overshadowed the process of region-
building in the Mediterranean—whether that process is motivated by “realist” goals or by 
the desire to pursue the system-changing goals of a civilian power. EU enlargement has 
provided Europe with resources and markets that were always elusive in the Euro-Med 
process.  It has given the new members the badge of a European regional identity.   The 
Euro-Med process will continue within the context of the ENP but the Europe’s only 
viable region will be built by the project of enlargement.  
 
Nonetheless, despite this suggestion that there is an unhappy connection between 
the EMP and EU enlargement, it is not clear that the Southern Mediterranean would be 
better off without the Euro-Med partnership.  After all, MEDA has poured billions of 
euros into the Southern Mediterranean but very little into countries of the eastern 
“neighborhood,” such as Ukraine.  One could argue, of course, that countries to the east 
of the EU are potential members of the European “club.”  As such they may have 
privileged access to EU resources that will never be available to the NMMCs.   
Nonetheless, to date, the Southern Mediterranean receives more aid than ever envisioned 
for Europe’s eastern neighbors in the ENP.  
 
Furthermore, as suggested above, it is not entirely the fault of the EU that sub-
regional cooperation has faltered in the Southern Mediterranean.  Because of their 
exclusive focus on Europe for aid and trade, Southern Mediterranean countries have not 
been eager to cooperate among themselves. The EU is quite happy to work with other 
regional groupings, such as ASEAN and MercoSur; and, as noted above, has offered to 
help stimulate sub-regional cooperation in the Mediterranean.  Indeed, if the NMMCs 
would resolve to create a cooperative sub-region, they would be a more powerful 
negotiating partner for the EU.  EU enlargement and the ENP may, in the end, not be 
helpful to the Barcelona Process, but the process itself is clearly in need of reform and its  18
disappointments have many causes.  As for the ENP itself, we can expect it to be a weak 
policy instrument—whether used as an instrument of power or  as long as the prospect of 
EU membership is not offered to Europe’s “neighbors.” 
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